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Abstract
We study the regret of optimal strategies for online convex optimization games. Using von Neumann’s
minimax theorem, we show that the optimal regret in this adversarial setting is closely related to the
behavior of the empirical minimization algorithm in a stochastic process setting: it is equal to the
maximum, over joint distributions of the adversary’s action sequence, of the difference between a sum
of minimal expected losses and the minimal empirical loss. We show that the optimal regret has a
natural geometric interpretation, since it can be viewed as the gap in Jensen’s inequality for a concave
functional—the minimizer over the player’s actions of expected loss—defined on a set of probability
distributions. We use this expression to obtain upper and lower bounds on the regret of an optimal
strategy for a variety of online learning problems. Our method provides upper bounds without the need
to construct a learning algorithm; the lower bounds provide explicit optimal strategies for the adversary.
1 Introduction
Within the Theory of Learning, two particular topics have gained significant popularity over the past 20 years:
Statistical Learning and Online Adversarial Learning. Papers on the former typically study generalization
bounds, convergence rates, complexity measures of function classes—all under the assumption that the
examples are drawn, typically in an i.i.d. manner, from some underlying distribution. Working under
such an assumption, Statistical Learning finds its roots in statistics, probability theory, high-dimensional
geometry, and one can argue that the main questions are by now relatively well-understood.
Online Learning, while having its origins in the early 90’s, recently became a popular area of research
once again. One might argue that it is the assumptions, or lack thereof, that make online learning attractive.
Indeed, it is often assumed that the observed data is generated maliciously rather than being drawn from
some fixed distribution. Moreover, in contrast with the “batch learning” flavor of Statistical Learning, the
sequential nature of the online problem lets the adversary change its strategy in the middle of the interaction.
It is no surprise that this adversarial learning seems quite a bit more difficult than its statistical cousin. The
worst case adversarial analysis does provide a realistic modeling in learning scenarios such as network security
applications, email spam detection, network routing etc., which is largely responsible for the renewed interest
in this area.
Upon a review of the central results in adversarial online learning—most of which can be found in
the recent book Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [5]—one cannot help but notice frequent similarities between the
guarantees on performance of online algorithms and the analogous guarantees under stochastic assumptions.
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However, discerning an explicit link has remained elusive. Vovk [17] notices this phenomenon: “for some
important problems, the adversarial bounds of on-line competitive learning theory are only a tiny amount
worse than the average-case bounds for some stochastic strategies of Nature.”
In this paper, we attempt to build a bridge between adversarial online learning and statistical learning.
Using von Neumann’s minimax theorem, we show that the optimal regret of an algorithm for online convex
optimization is exactly the difference between a sum of minimal expected losses and the minimal empirical
loss, under an adversarial choice of a stochastic process generating the data. This leads to upper and lower
bounds for the optimal regret that exhibit several similarities to results from statistical learning.
The online convex optimization game proceeds in rounds. At each of these T rounds, the player (learner)
predicts a vector in some convex set, and the adversary responds with a convex function which determines
the player’s loss at the chosen point. In order to emphasize the relationship with the stochastic setting, we
denote the player’s choice as f ∈ F and the adversary’s choice as z ∈ Z. Note that this differs, for instance,
from the notation in [1].
Suppose F is a convex compact class of functions, which constitutes the set of Player’s choices. The
Adversary draws his choices from a closed compact set Z. We also define a continuous bounded loss function
` : Z ×F → R and assume that ` is convex in the second argument. Denote by `(F) = {`(·, f) : f ∈ F} the
associated loss class. Let P be the set of all probability distributions on Z. Denote a sequence (Z1, . . . , ZT )
by ZT1 . We denote a joint distribution on ZT by a bold-face p and its conditional and marginal distributions
by pt
(·|Zt−11 ) and pmt , respectively.
The online convex optimization interaction is described as follows.
Online Convex Optimization (OCO) Game
At each time step t = 1 to T ,
• Player chooses ft ∈ F
• Adversary chooses zt ∈ Z
• Player observes zt and suffers loss `(zt, ft)
The objective of the player is to minimize the regret
T∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f).
It turns out that many online learning scenarios can be realized as instances of OCO, including prediction
with expert advice, data compression, sequential investment, and forecasting with side information (see, for
example, [5]).
2 Applying von Neumann’s minimax theorem
Define the value of the OCO game—which we also call the minimax regret—as
RT = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−1∈F
sup
zT−1∈Z
inf
fT∈F
sup
zT∈Z
(
T∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
)
. (1)
The OCO game has a purely “optimization” flavor. However, applying von Neumann’s minimax theorem
shows that its value is closely related to the behavior of the empirical minimization algorithm in a stochastic
process setting.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions on F , Z, and ` given in the previous section,
RT = sup
p
E
[
T∑
t=1
inf
ft∈F
E
[
`(Zt, ft)|Zt−11
]− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(Zt, f)
]
, (2)
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where the supremum is over all joint distributions p on ZT and the expectations are over the sequence of
random variables {Z1, . . . , ZT } drawn according to p.
The proof relies on the following version of von Neumann’s minimax theorem; it appears as Theorem 7.1
in [5].
Proposition 2. Let M(x, y) denote a bounded real-valued function on X × Y, where X and Y are convex
sets and X is compact. Suppose that M(·, y) is convex and continuous for each fixed y ∈ Y and M(x, ·) is
concave for each x ∈ X . Then
inf
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
M(x, y) = sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈X
M(x, y).
Proof of Theorem 1. For the sake of clarity, we prove the Theorem for T = 2. The proof for T > 2
uses essentially the same steps while the notation is less transparent. We postpone the general proof to the
Appendix.
We have
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
inf
f2∈F
sup
z2∈Z
(
2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
)
.
Consider the last optimization choice z2. Suppose we instead draw z2 according to a distribution, and
compute the expected value of the quantity in the parentheses. Then it is clear that maximizing this expected
value over all distributions on Z is equivalent to maximizing over z2, with the optimizing distribution
concentrated on the optimal point. Hence,
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
inf
f2∈F
sup
p2∈P
E z2∼p2
[
2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
. (3)
We now apply Proposition 2 to the last inf / sup pair in (3) with
M(f2, p2) = E z2∼p2
[
2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
,
which is convex in f2 (by assumption) and linear in p2. Moreover, the set F is compact, and both F and P
are convex. We conclude that
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
inf
f2∈F
sup
p2∈P
E z2∼p2
[
2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
= inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
sup
p2∈P
inf
f2∈F
E z2∼p2
[
2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
= inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
sup
p2∈P
[
`(z1, f1) + inf
f2∈F
E z∼p2`(z, f2)− E z2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
= inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
[
`(z1, f1) + sup
p2∈P
{
inf
f2∈F
E z∼p2`(z, f2)− E z2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(z1,f1)
Now consider the supremum over z1. Using the same argument as before, we have
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
A(z1, f1) = inf
f1∈F
sup
p1∈P
E z1∼p1A(z1, f1).
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Observe that the function
M(f1, p1) = E z1∼p1A(z1, f1)
is convex in f1 and linear in p1. Appealing to Proposition 2 again, we obtain
R2 = inf
f1∈F
sup
p1∈P
E z1∼p1A(z1, f1)
= sup
p1∈P
inf
f1∈F
E z1∼p1
[
`(z1, f1) + sup
p2∈P
{
inf
f2∈F
E z∼p2`(z, f2)− E z2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}]
= sup
p1∈P
[(
inf
f1∈F
E z∼p1`(z, f1)
)
+ E z1∼p1 sup
p2∈P
{
inf
f2∈F
E z∼p2`(z, f2)− E z2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}]
= sup
p1∈P
E z1∼p1 sup
p2∈P
{(
inf
f1∈F
E z∼p1`(z, f1)
)
+ inf
f2∈F
E z∼p2`(z, f2)− E z2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}
A key observation that makes the above argument valid is that the choice of f1 does not depend on p2, and
by the same token p2 is not influenced by a particular choice of f1. Now, it is easy to see that maximizing
over p1, then averaging over z1 ∼ p1, and then maximizing over p2(·|z1) is the same as maximizing over joint
distributions p on (z1, z2) and averaging over z1. Thus,
R2 = sup
p
E z1∼p1
{(
inf
f1∈F
E z∼p1`(z, f1)
)
+
(
inf
f2∈F
E z∼p2`(z, f2)
)
− E z2∼p2 inf
f∈F
2∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}
which proves the Theorem for T = 2.
We can think of Eq. (2) as a game where the adversary goes first. At every round he “plays” a distribution
and the player responds with a function that minimizes the conditional expectation.
We remark that we can allow the player to choose ft’s non-deterministically in the original OCO game.
In that case, the original infimum should be over distributions on F . We then do not need convexity of ` in
f ∈ F ’s in order to apply von Neumann’s theorem, and the resulting expression for the value of the game is
the same.
3 First Steps
The present work focuses on analyzing the expression in Equation (2) for a range of different choices of Z
and F , as well as for various assumptions made about the loss function `. We are not only interested in
upper- and lower-bounding the value of the game RT , but also in determining the types of distributions p
that maximize or almost maximize the expression in (2). To that end, define p-regret as
E
[
T∑
t=1
min
ft∈F
E
[
`(Zt, ft)|Zt−11
]−min
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(Zt, f)
]
(4)
for any joint distribution p of (z1, . . . , zT ) ∈ ZT . In this section we will provide an array of analytical tools
for working with RT (p).
3.1 Regret for IID and Product Distributions
Let us start with a simple example. Suppose Z = [0, 1], F = [0, 1], and `(z, f) = |z − f |. For this game, we
might try various strategies p and compute the value RT (p). One choice of the joint distribution p could
4
be to put mass on disjoint intervals of Z at each round. Suppose the conditional distribution at time t,
pt
(·|Zt−11 ) is uniform on [ t−1T , tT ]. Then,
f∗t = arg min
ft∈F
E
[
`(Z, ft)|Zt−11
]
=
t+ 1/2
T
,
the midpoint of the interval, while the minimizer over the data fˆ = arg minf∈F
∑T
t=1 `(Zt, f) is close to
1
2 .
It is easy to check that RT (p) is negative and linear in T .
This example suggests that the chosen distribution p is not optimal, as it forces the best decision in
hindsight to be bad as compared to the intermediate decisions. The root of the problem appears in the
disjoint nature of the support of the distributions. One might wonder whether this suggests that the optimal
distribution should, in fact, be the same between rounds. Hence, a natural next step is to consider i.i.d. as
well as general product distributions p as candidates for maximizing RT (p).
The following Lemma states that p-regret is non-negative for any choice of an i.i.d. distribution.
Lemma 3. For any i.i.d. distribution p, RT (p) ≥ 0. Hence, RT ≥ 0.
Proof. For an i.i.d. distribution Eq. (4) becomes
1
T
RT (p) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ft∈F
E [`(Z, ft)]− E min
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(Zt, f)
= min
f∈F
E [`(Z, f)]− E min
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(Zt, f)
≥ min
f∈F
E [`(Z, f)]−min
f∈F
E
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(Zt, f)
= 0
where the inequality is due to the fact that E min ≤ minE .
Observe that RT (p) for an i.i.d. process is the difference between the minimum expected loss and the
expectation of the empirical loss of an empirical minimizer.
With the goal of studying various types of distributions, we now define the following hierarchy:
Ri.i.dT := sup
p=p×...×p
RT (p); R
indep.
T := sup
p=p1×...×pT
RT (p),
where p, p1, . . . , pT are arbitrary distributions on Z. It is immediately clear that
0 ≤ Ri.i.dT ≤ Rindep.T ≤ RT . (5)
We will see that, given particular assumptions on F ,Z and `, some of the gaps in the above hierarchy are
significant, while others are not. Before continuing, however, we need to develop some tools for analyzing
the minimax regret.
3.2 Tools for a General Analysis
We now introduce two new objects that help to simplify the expression in (2) as well as derive properties of
RT (p).
Definition 4. Given sets F ,Z, we can define the minimum expected loss functional Φ as
Φ(p) := inf
f∈F
E Z∼p [`(Z, f)]
where p is some distribution on Z.
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Defining an inner product 〈h, p〉 = ∫
z
h(z)dp(z) for a distribution p, we observe that Φ(p) = inff∈F 〈`(·, f), p〉.
Definition 5. For any Z1, . . . , ZT ∈ ZT , we denote PˆT = 1T
∑T
t=1 1Zt(·), the empirical distribution.
With this additional notation, we can rewrite (4) as
1
T
RT (p) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
EΦ(pt
(·|Zt−11 ))− EΦ(PˆT ). (6)
Thus, the Adversary’s task is to induce a large deviation between the average sequence of conditional
distributions {pt
(·|Zt−11 )} and an empirical sample PˆT from these conditionals, where the deviation is
defined by way of the functional Φ. It is easy to check that Φ and RT are concave, as the next lemma shows.
The proof is postponed to the Appendix.
Lemma 6. The functional Φ(·) is concave on the space of distributions over Z and RT (·) is concave with
respect to joint distributions on ZT .
It is indeed concavity of Φ that is key to understanding the behavior of RT . A hint of this can already
be seen in the proof of Lemma 3, where the only inequality is due to the concavity of the min. In the next
section, we show how this description of regret can be interpreted through a Bregman divergence in terms
of Φ.
3.3 Divergences and the Gap in Jensen’s Inequality
We now show how to interpret regret through the lens of Jensen’s Inequality by providing yet another
expression for it, now in terms of Bregman Divergences. We begin by revisiting the i.i.d. case p = pT =
p× . . .× p, for some distribution p on Z. Equation (6) simplifies to a very natural quantity,
1
T
RT (pT ) = Φ(p)− EΦ(PˆT ). (7)
Notice that PˆT is a random quantity, and in particular that E PˆT = p. As Φ(·) is concave, with an
immediate application of Jensen’s Inequality we obtain RT (pT ) ≥ 0. For arbitrary joint distributions p, we
can similarly interpret regret as a “gap” in Jensen’s Inequality, albeit with some added complexity.
Definition 7. If F is any convex differentiable1 functional on the space of distributions on Z, we define
Bregman divergence with respect to F as
DF (q, p) = F (q)− F (p)− 〈∇F (p), q − p〉.
If F is non-differentiable, we can take a particular subgradient vp ∈ ∂F (p) in place of ∇F (p). Note that
the notion of subgradients is well-defined even for infinite-dimensional convex functions. Having chosen2 a
mapping p 7→ vp ∈ ∂F (p), we define a generalized divergence with respect to F and vp as
DF (q, p) = F (q)− F (p)− 〈vp, q − p〉.
Throughout the paper, we focus only on the divergence D−Φ, and thus we omit −Φ from the notation
for simplicity.
Given the definition of divergence, it immediately follows that, for a random distribution q,
Φ(E q)− EΦ(q) = ED(q,E q)
1Here, we mean differentiable with respect to the Fre´chet or Gaˆteaux derivative. We refer the reader to [7] for precise
definitions of functional Bregman Divergences.
2The assumption of compactness of F , together with the characterization of the subgradient set in Section 4.2, allow us, for
instance, to define the mapping p 7→ vp by putting a uniform measure on the subgradient set and defining vp to be the expected
subgradient with respect to it. In fact, the choice of the mapping is not important, as long as it does not depend on q.
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since the linear term disappears under the expectation. This simple observation is quite useful; notice we
now have an even simpler expression for i.i.d. regret (7):
1
T
R(pT ) = ED(PˆT , p).
In other words, the pT -regret is equal to the expected divergence between the empirical distribution and its
expectation. This will be a starting point for obtaining lower bounds for RT . For general joint distributions
p, let us rewrite the expression in (6) as
E t∼UEΦ(pt
(·|Zt−11 ))− EΦ(PˆT ),
where we replaced the average with a uniform distribution on the rounds. Roughly speaking, the next
lemma says that one can obtain EΦ(PˆT ) from E t∼UEΦ(pt
(·|Zt−11 )) through three applications of Jensen’s
inequality, due to various expectations being “pulled” inside or outside of Φ.
Lemma 8. Suppose p is an arbitrary joint distribution. Denote by pt
(·|Zt−11 ) and pmt the conditional and
marginal distributions, respectively. Then
1
T
R(p) = −∆0 −∆1 + ∆2, (8)
where
∆0 =
1
T
∑
t
D (pmt , 1T ∑t′ pmt′ ) , ∆1 = 1T ∑E pD(pt (·|Zt−11 ) , pmt ),
∆2 = E pD
(
PˆT ,
1
T
∑
pmt
)
,
and pmt = E [pt
(·|Zt−11 )] is the marginal distribution at time t.
Proof. The marginal distribution satisfies E pt
(·|Zt−11 ) = pmt , and it is easy to see that E PˆT = 1T ∑t pmt .
Given this, we see that
1
T
R(p) = E p
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
Φ(pt
(·|Zt−11 ))− Φ(PˆT )
]
=
−∆1︷ ︸︸ ︷
E p
[
1
T
∑
t
{
Φ(pt
(·|Zt−11 ))− Φ(pmt )}
]
+
−∆0︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
T
∑
t
Φ(pmt )− Φ
(
1
T
∑
t p
m
t
)
−
−∆2︷ ︸︸ ︷
E p
[
Φ(PˆT )− Φ
(
1
T
∑
t p
m
t
)]
.
This lemma sheds some light on the influence of an i.i.d. vs. product vs. arbitrary joint distribution on
the regret. For product distributions, every conditional distribution is identical to its marginal distributions,
thus implying ∆1 = 0. Furthermore, for any i.i.d. distribution, each marginal distribution is identical to
the average marginal, thus implying that ∆0 = 0. With this in mind, it is tempting to assert that the
largest regret is obtained at an i.i.d. distribution, since transitions from i.i.d to product, and from product
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to arbitrary distribution, only subtract from the regret value. While appealing, this is unfortunately not
the case: in many instances the final term, ∆2, can be made larger with a non-i.i.d. (and even non-product)
distribution, even at the added cost of positive ∆0 and ∆1 terms, so that Ri.i.d.T = o(RT ) as a function of T .
In some cases, however, we show that a lower bound on the regret can be obtained with an i.i.d. distribution
at a cost of only a constant factor.
4 Properties of Φ
In statistical learning, the rate of decay of prediction error is known to depend on the curvature of the loss:
more curvature leads to faster rates (see, for example, [12, 13, 3]), and slow (e.g. Ω(T−1/2)) rates occur when
the loss is not strictly convex, or when the minimizer of the expected loss is not unique [12, 14]. There is a
striking parallel with the behavior of the regret in online convex optimization; again the curvature of the loss
plays a central role. Roughly speaking, if ` is strongly convex or exp-concave, second-order gradient-descent
methods ensure that the regret grows no faster than log T (e.g. [8]); if ` is linear, the regret can grow no
faster than
√
T (e.g. [18]); intermediate rates can be achieved as well if the curvature varies [2].
The previous section expresses regret as a sum of divergences under Φ, and that suggests that the
curvature of Φ should be an important factor in determining the rates of regret. We shall see that this is
the case: curvature of Φ leads to large regret, while flatness of Φ implies small regret.
We will now show how properties of the loss function class determine the curvature of Φ. In later sections
we will show how such curvature properties lead directly to particular rates for RT . First, let us provide a
fruitful geometric picture, rooted in convex analysis. It allows us to see the function Φ, roughly speaking,
as a mirror image of the function class.
4.1 Geometric interpretation of Φ
In general, the set Z is uncountable, so care must be taken with regard to various notions we are about
to introduce. We refer the reader to Chapter 10 of [4] for the discussion of finite vs infinite-dimensional
spaces in convex analysis. Since Z is compact by assumption, we can discretize it to a fine enough level
such that the upper and lower bounds of this paper hold, as long as the results are non-asymptotic. In the
present Section, for simplicity of exposition, we will suppose that the set Z is finite with cardinality d. This
assumption is required only for the geometric interpretation; our proofs are correct as long as Z is compact.
Hence, distributions over the set Z are associated with d-dimensional vectors. Furthermore, each f ∈ F
is specified by its d values on the points. We write `f ∈ Rd for the loss vector of f , `(·, f). Let us denote
the set of all such vectors by `(F). We then have
−Φ(p) = − inf
f∈F
E p`(Z, f) = sup
`f∈`(F)
〈−`f , p〉 = σ−`(F)(p),
where σS(x) = sups∈S〈s, x〉 is the support function for the set S. This function is one of the most basic
objects of convex analysis (see, for instance, [9]). It is well-known that σS = σcoS ; in other words, the
support function does not change with respect to taking convex hull (see Proposition 2.2.1, page 137, [9]).
To this end, let us denote S = co[−`(F)] ⊂ Rd.
It is known that the support function is sublinear and its epigraph is a cone. To visualize the support
function, consider the Rd ×R space. Embed the set S ⊂ Rd in Rd × {1} (see Figure 1). Then construct the
conic hull of S × {1}. It turns out that the cone which is dual to the constructed conic hull is the epigraph
of the support function σS . The dual cone is the set of vectors which form obtuse or right angles with all
the vectors in the original cone. Hence, one can visualize the surface σS as being at the right angles to the
conic hull of S × {1}. Now, the function Φ is just the restriction of σS to the simplex. We can now deduce
properties of Φ from properties of the loss class.
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Figure 1: Dual cone as the epigraph of the support function. Φ is the restriction to the simplex.
4.2 Differentiability of Φ
Lemma 9. The subdifferential set of Φ is the set of expected minimizers:
∂Φ(p) = {`f : f ∈ arg min
f∈F
E p`(Z, f)}.
Hence, the functional Φ is differentiable at a distribution p iff arg minf∈F E p`(z, f) is unique.
Proof. We have seen that −Φ is the support function of co[−`(F)] restricted to the probability simplex.
The subdifferential set of the support function is the support set, that is, the set of points achieving the
supremum in the definition of support function.
By examining Figure 1, one can see why this statement is correct: roughly speaking, a point on the
boundary of S, which supports some distribution p, serves as a normal to a hyperplane tangent to Φ at p.
The precise proof of this fact, found in Proposition 2.1.5 in [9], can be extended to the infinite-dimensional
case as well.
For Φ to be differentiable, the subdifferential set has to be singleton. This immediately gives us the
criterion for the differentiability of Φ stated above.
In particular, for Φ to be differentiable for all distributions, the loss function class should not have a “face”
exposed to the origin. This geometrical picture and its implications will be studied further in Section 6.
It is easy to verify that strict convexity of `(z, f) in f implies uniqueness of the minimizer for any p and,
hence, differentiability of Φ.
4.3 Flatness of Φ through curvature of `
In this section we show that curvature in the loss function leads to flatness of Φ. We would indeed expect
such a result to hold since regret decaying faster than O(T−1/2) is known to occur in the case of curved losses
(e.g. [2]), and decomposition (6) suggests that this should imply flatness of Φ. More precisely, we show that
if `(f, z) is strongly convex in f with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖, then Φ is strongly flat with respect to the
`1 norm on the space of distributions. Before stating the main result, we provide several definitions.
Definition 10. A convex function F is α-flat (or α-smooth) with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ when
F (y)− F (x) ≤ 〈∇F (x), y − x〉+ α‖x− y‖2 (9)
for all x, y. We will say that a concave function G is α-flat if −G satisfies (9).
Let us also recall the definition of `1 (or variational) norm on distributions.
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Figure 2: The two terms in the decomposition (10).
Definition 11. For two distributions p, q on Z, we define
‖p− q‖1 =
∫
Z
|dp(z)− dq(z)|.
Theorem 12. Suppose `(z, f) is σ-strongly convex in f , that is,
`
(
z,
f + g
2
)
≤ `(z, f) + `(z, g)
2
− σ
8
‖f − g‖2
for any z ∈ Z and f, g ∈ F . Suppose further that ` is L− Lipschitz, that is,
|`(z, f)− `(z, g)| ≤ L‖f − g‖.
Under these conditions, the Φ-functional is 2L
2
σ -flat with respect to ‖ · ‖1.
The proof uses the following lemma, which shows stability of the minimizers. Its proof appears in the
Appendix.
Lemma 13. Fix two distributions p, q. Let fp and fq be the functions achieving the minimum in Φ(p) and
Φ(q), respectively. Under the conditions of Theorem 12,
‖fp − fq‖ ≤ 2L
σ
‖p− q‖1.
Proof of Theorem 12. We have
Φ(p)− Φ(q) = E p`(z, fp)− E q`(z, fq) = (E p`(z, fp)− E q`(z, fp)) + (E q`(z, fp)− E q`(z, fq)) . (10)
Let us first study the second term in the expression above. As fp is the minimizer of E p`(z, f), we have:
E p [`(z, fp)− `(z, fq)] ≤ 0
So
E q [`(z, fp)− `(z, fq)] ≤ E q [`(z, fp)− `(z, fq)]− E p [`(z, fp)− `(z, fq)]
=
∫
(`(z, fp)− `(z, fq))(dq(z)− dp(z))
≤ L
∫
‖fp − fq‖|dp(z)− dq(z)|.
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Using Lemma 13, we get:
E q [`(z, fp)− `(z, fq)] ≤ 2L
2
σ
‖p− q‖21. (11)
As for the first term in (10),
E p`(z, fp)− E q`(z, fp) =
∫
z
`(z, fp)(dp(z)− dq(z)) = 〈`(·, fp), (p− q)〉. (12)
The fact that `(·, fp) is a subdifferential of Φ at p is proved in the appendix. We conclude that the first and
the second terms in (10) are the first and the second order terms in the expansion of Φ.
We remark that we can arrive at above results by explicitly considering the dual function Φ∗, proving
strong convexity of Φ∗ with respect to ‖ · ‖∞ (which follows from our assumption on `), and then concluding
strong flatness of Φ with respect to ‖ · ‖1. This is indeed the main intuition at the heart of our proof.
5 Upper Bounds on RT
In this section, we exhibit two general upper bounds onRT that hold for a wide class of OCO games. The first
bound, which holds when the functional Φ is differentiable and not too curved, is of the form RT = O(log T ).
The second, which holds for arbitrary Φ, e.g. where the functional may even have a non-differentiability, is
stated in terms of the Rademacher complexity of the class F . Such Rademacher complexity results imply a
regret upper bound on the order of
√
T .
An intriguing observation is that these bounds are proved without actually exhibiting a strategy for the
Player, as is typically done. This illustrates the power of the minimax duality approach: we can prove the
existence of an optimal algorithm, and determine its performance, all without providing its construction.
Throughout, we shall refer to O(
√
T ) rates as “slow rates” and O(log T ) as fast rates. These notions are
borrowed from the statistical learning literature, where fast rates of convergence of the empirical minimizer
to the best in class arise from certain assumptions, such as convexity of the class and square loss. The
slow rates, on the other hand, are exhibited by the situations where the expected minimizer of the loss is
non-unique.
5.1 Fast Rates: Exploiting the Curvature
For differentiable Φ with bounded second derivative, we can prove that the regret grows no faster than
logarithmically in T . Of course, rates of log T have been given previously [8, 16, 17]. We build upon these
results in the present work by showing that logarithmic regret must always arise when Φ satisfies a flatness
condition.
Theorem 14. Suppose the Φ functional is differentiable and α-flat with respect the norm ‖ · ‖1 on P. Then
RT ≤ 4α log T .
We immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 15. Suppose functions `(z, f) are σ-strongly convex and L−Lipschitz in f . Then RT ≤ 8L2σ log T.
Furthermore, as we show in Section 7.3, the log T bound is tight for quadratic functions; there is an
explicit joint distribution for the adversary which attains this value.
The proof of Theorem 14 involves the following lemma.
Lemma 16. The p-regret can be upper-bounded as
RT (p) ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
t · D
(
Pˆt, P¯t
)]
where P¯t(·) =
(
t−1
t
)
Pˆt−1(·) + 1t pt
(·|Zt−11 ).
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Proof. Consider the following difference:
δT : =
1
T
EΦ
(
pT (·|ZT−11 )
)− EΦ(PˆT)
=
1
T
EΦ
(
pT (·|ZT−11 )
)− EΦ (P¯T )+ EΦ (P¯T )− EΦ(PˆT)
For the first difference we use concavity of Φ. The second difference can be written as a divergence because
the linear term vanishes in expectation. Indeed,
E
〈
∇Φ (P¯T ) , 1
T
(1ZT (·)− pT (·|ZT−11 ))
〉
= 0
because the gradient does not depend on ZT , while
E ZT
[
1ZT (·)|ZT−11
]
= pT (·|ZT−11 ).
Hence,
δT ≤ −
(
T − 1
T
)
EΦ(PˆT−1) + ED
(
PˆT , P¯T
)
and so
RT (p) =
T∑
t=1
EΦ
(
pt(·|Zt−11 )
)− TEΦ(PˆT)
=
T−1∑
t=1
EΦ
(
pt(·|Zt−11 )
)
+ TδT
≤
T−1∑
t=1
EΦ
(
pt(·|Zt−11 )
)− (T − 1)EΦ(PˆT−1) + TED (PˆT , P¯T) .
Before proceeding, note that we may interpret P¯t as the conditional expectation of the uniform distribu-
tion Pˆt given Z1, . . . , Zt−1. The flatness of Φ will allow us to show that P¯t deviates very slightly from Pˆt in
expectation—indeed, by no more than O( 1t2 ). This is crucial for obtaining fast rates: for general Φ (which
may be non-differentiable), it is natural to expect D
(
Pˆt, P¯t
)
= Ω(1/t). In this case, the regret would be
bounded by O(
∑
t t · 1/t) = O(T ), rendering the above lemma useless.
Proof of Theorem 14. We have that the divergence terms in Lemma 16 are bounded as
t · D
(
Pˆt, P¯t
)
≤ tα
∥∥∥∥1t 1Zt(·)− 1t pt(·|Zt−11 )
∥∥∥∥2
1
≤ 4α
t
because the variational distance between distributions is bounded by 4:(∫
z
∣∣δZt(z)− dpt(z|ZT−11 )∣∣)2 ≤ 4.
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5.2 General
√
T Upper Bounds
We start with the definition of Rademacher averages, one of the central notions of complexity of a function
class.
Definition 17. Denote by
R̂adT (`(F )) :=
1√
T
E T1
(
sup
f∈F
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
t`(f, Zt)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
the data-dependent Rademacher averages of the class `(F). Here, 1 . . . T are independent Rademacher
random variables (uniform on {±1}).
We will omit the subscript T and dependence on ZT1 , for the sake of simplicity. In statistical learning
theory, Rademacher averages often provide the tightest guarantees on the performance of empirical risk
minimization and other methods. The next result shows that the Rademacher averages play a key role in
online convex optimization as well, as the minimax regret is upper bounded by the worst-case (over the
sample) Rademacher averages. In the next section, we will also show lower bounds in terms of Rademacher
averages for certain linear games, showing that this notion of complexity is fundamental for OCO.
Theorem 18.
RT ≤ 2
√
T sup
ZT1 ∈ZT
R̂ad(`(F)).
Proof. Let p be an arbitrary joint distribution. Let fˆ be an empirical minimizer over ZT1 , a sequence-
dependent function. Then
1
T
RT (p) = E
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
Φ(pt
(·|Zt−11 ))− Φ(PˆT )] ≤ E 1T
T∑
t=1
[
E pt(·|Zt−11 )`(Z, fˆ)−
1
T
T∑
s=1
`(Zs, fˆ)
]
,
as the particular choice of fˆ is (sub)optimal. Replacing the fˆ by the supremum over F ,
1
T
RT (p) ≤ E 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
E pt(·|Zt−11 )`(Z, fˆ)− `(Zt, fˆ)
]
≤ E sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
E pt(·|Zt−11 )`(Z, f)− `(Zt, f)
]
= E sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
E pt(·|Zt−11 )`(Z
′
t, f)− `(Zt, f)
]
≤ E sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
[`(Z ′t, f)− `(Zt, f)] ,
where we renamed each dummy variable Z as Z ′t. Even though Zt and Z
′
t have the same conditional
expectation, we cannot generally exchange them keeping the distribution of the whole quantity intact.
Indeed, the conditional distributions for τ > t will depend on Zt and not on Z ′t. The trick is to exchange
them one by one3, starting from t = T and going backwards, introducing an additional supremum. (One
can view the sequence {Z ′t} as being tangent to {Zt} (see [6]).) To this end, for any fixed T ∈ {−1,+1},
E sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
[`(Z ′t, f)− `(Zt, f)]
= E sup
f∈F
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=1
[`(Z ′t, f)− `(Zt, f)] +
1
T
T (`(Z ′T , f)− `(ZT , f))
)
3We thank Ambuj Tewari for pointing out a mistake in our original proof. We refer to [15] for a similar analysis.
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because for the last step, indeed, ZT and Z ′T can be exchanged. Since this holds for any T , we can take it
to be a Rademacher random variable. Thus,
E sup
f∈F
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=1
[`(Z ′t, f)− `(Zt, f)] +
1
T
T (`(Z ′T , f)− `(ZT , f))
)
≤ E TE sup
f∈F
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=1
[`(Z ′t, f)− `(Zt, f)] +
1
T
T (`(Z ′T , f)− `(ZT , f))
)
≤ sup
ZT ,Z′T
E ZT−11 E T supf∈F
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=1
[`(Z ′t, f)− `(Zt, f)] +
1
T
T (`(Z ′T , f)− `(ZT , f))
)
,
where we assumed the worst case over ZT , Z ′T . The first expectation is now taken over the shorter sequence
1, . . . , T − 1. Repeating the process, we have that 1TRT (p) is bounded by
1
T
RT (p) ≤ sup
ZT1 ,Z
′T
1
E T1 sup
f∈F
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t (`(Z ′t, f)− `(Zt, f))
)
≤ 2 sup
ZT1
E T1 sup
f∈F
1
T
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
t`(Zt, f)
∣∣∣∣∣ = 2 1√T supZT1 R̂ad(`(F )).
Properties of Rademacher averages are well-known. For instance, the Rademacher averages of a function
class coincide with those of its convex hull. Furthermore, if ` is Lipschitz, the complexity of `(F) can be upper
bounded by the complexity of F , multiplied by the Lipschitz constant. For example, we can immediately
conclude that if the loss function is Lipschitz and the function class is a convex hull of a finite number M of
functions, the minimax value of the game is bounded by RT ≤ C
√
T logM for some constant C. Similarly, a
class with VC-dimension d would have logM replaced by d. Theorem 18 is, therefore, giving us the flexibility
to upper bound the minimax value of OCO for very general classes of functions.
Finally, we remark that most known upper bounds on Rademacher averages do not depend on the
underlying distribution, as they hold for the worst-case empirical measure (see [13], p. 27). Thus, the
supremum over the sequences might not be a hinderance to using known bounds for R̂ad(`(F)).
5.3 Linear Losses: Primal-Dual Ball Game
Let us examine the linear loss more closely. Of particular interest are linear games when F = B‖·‖∗ is a ball
in some norm ‖ · ‖∗ and Z = B‖·‖, the two norms being dual. For this case, Theorem 18 gives an upper
bound of
1
T
RT ≤ 2 sup
ZT1
E T1 sup
f∈F
fT
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tZt
)
= 2 sup
ZT1
E T1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tZt
∥∥∥∥∥ . (13)
Fix Z1 . . . ZT−1 and observe that the expected norm is a convex function of ZT . Hence, the supremum over
ZT is achieved at the boundary of Z. The same statement holds for all Zt’s. Let z∗1 , . . . , z∗T be the sequence
achieving the supremum. Now take a distribution for round t to be p∗t (z) =
1
2
(
1z∗t (·) + 1−z∗t (·)
)
and let
p∗ = p∗1 × . . .× p∗T be the product distribution. It is easy to see that
1
T
RT ≤ 2 sup
ZT1
E T1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tZt
∥∥∥∥∥ = 2E T1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tz
∗
t
∥∥∥∥∥
= 2E p∗E T1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tZt
∥∥∥∥∥ = 2√T E p∗R̂ad(F). (14)
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Also note that p∗t has zero mean. It will be shown in Section 7.1 that the lower bound arising from this
distribution is
E p∗E T1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tZt
∥∥∥∥∥ = 1√T E p∗R̂ad(F),
which is only a factor of 2 away. Thus, the adversary can play a product distribution that arises from the
maximization in (13) and achieve regret at most a factor 2 from the optimum.
6 Ω(
√
T ) bounds for non-differentiable Φ
In this section, we develop lower bounds on the minimax value RT based on the geometric view-point
described in Section 4.1.
Theorem 14 shows that the regret is upper bounded by log T for the case of strongly convex losses, and
this upper bound is tight if the loss functions are quadratic, as we show later in the paper. Thus, flatness
of Φ implies low regret. What about the converse? It turns out that if Φ is non-differentiable (has a point
of infinite curvature), the regret is lower-bounded by
√
T , and this rate is achieved with p = pT , where p
corresponds to a point of non-differentiability of Φ.
The geometric viewpoint is fruitful here: vertices (points of non-differentiability) of Φ correspond to
exposed faces in the loss class S = co[−`(F)] (see Figure 1) suggesting that the lower bounds of Ω(√T )
arise from having two distinct minimizers of expected error—a striking parallel to the analogous results for
stochastic settings [12, 14].
To be more precise, vertices of σS (and Φ) translate into flat parts (non-singleton exposed faces) of
S(co[−`(F)]) and the other way around. Corresponding to an exposed face is a supporting hyperplane. If
`(F) is non-negative, then any exposed face facing the origin is supported by a hyperplane with positive
co-ordinates (which can be normalized to get a distribution). So a non-singleton face exposed to the origin
is equivalent to having at least two distinct minimizers f and g of E p`(Z, ·) for some p, as discussed in
Section 4.2. We demonstrate this scenario, along with the supporting hyperplane, 〈`f , p〉 = 〈`g, p〉, in Figure
3.
p
−!f
−!g
Figure 3: The face of the convex hull of the loss class is supported by a probability distribution p.
Suppose there is a non-singleton face FS(p) of co[−`(F)] supported by some distribution p. It is known
(see [9]) that any exposed face is a convex set. The extreme points of this convex set are vectors `f (and not
convex combinations such as `f+`g2 ). Furthermore, for all `f , `g ∈ FS(p), we have 〈`f , p〉 = 〈`g, p〉.
Define the set of expected minimizers under p as
F∗ := {f ∈ F : E p`(Z, f) = inf
f∈F
E p`(Z, f)}.
Thus, −`(F∗) ⊆ FS(p) ⊆ co[−`(F)]. The lower bound we are about to state arises from fluctuations
of the empirical process over the set F∗. To ease the presentation, we will refer to the sample average
1
T
∑T
t=1 `(Zt, f) as Eˆ `(Z, f).
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Theorem 19. Suppose FS(p) is a non-singleton face of co[−`(F)], supported by p (i.e. |F∗| > 1). Fix any
f∗ ∈ F∗ and let Q ⊆ `(F∗) be any subset containing `(·, f∗). Define Q¯ = {g − `(·, f∗) : g ∈ Q}, the shifted
loss class. Then for T > T0(F),
1
T
RT ≥ 1
T
RT (pT )
= E sup
f∈F∗
[
E p`(Z, f)− Eˆ `(Z, f)
]
≥ c√
T
sup
Q⊆`(F∗)
E sup
q∈Q¯
Gq,
where Gq is the Gaussian process indexed by the (centered) functions in Q¯, and c is some absolute constant.
Proof. Recalling that E `(Z, f) = infg∈F E `(Z, g) = Φ(p) for all f ∈ F∗, we have
1
T
RT ≥ 1
T
RT (pT ) = Φ(p)− E pΦ(PˆT )
= Φ(p)− E inf
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(Zt, f)
≥ Φ(p)− E inf
f∈F∗
Eˆ `(Z, f)
= E sup
f∈F∗
[
E p`(Z, f)− Eˆ `(Z, f)
]
≥ sup
Q⊆`(F∗)
E sup
f :`f∈Q
[
E p`(Z, f)− Eˆ `(Z, f)
]
Now, fix any f∗ ∈ F∗. The proof of Theorem 2.2 in [11] reveals that empirical fluctuations are lower
bounded by the supremum of the Gaussian process indexed by Q¯. To be precise, there exists T0(F) such
that for T > T0(F) with probability greater than c1,
inf
f :`f∈Q
Eˆ (`(Z, f)− `(Z, f∗)) ≤ −c2
E supq∈Q¯Gq√
T
,
for some absolute constants c1, c2. Rearranging and using the fact that E `(Z, f)−E `(Z, f∗) = 0 for f ∈ F∗,
sup
f :`f∈Q
[
E `(Z, f)− Eˆ `(Z, f) + Eˆ `(Z, f∗)− E `(Z, f∗)
]
≥ c2
E supq∈Q¯Gq√
T
with probability at least c1. The supremum is non-negative because f∗ ∈ Q and therefore
E sup
f :`f∈Q
[
E `(Z, f)− Eˆ `(Z, f)
]
≥ c1c2
E supq∈Q¯Gq√
T
.
We remark that in the experts case, the lower bound on regret becomes
√
T logN , as the Gaussian
process reduces to N independent Gaussian random variables. We discuss this and other examples in the
next section.
7 Lower Bounds for Special Cases
We now provide lower bounds for particular games. Some of the results of the section are known: we show
how the proofs follow from the general lower bounds developed in the previous section.
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7.1 Linear Loss: Primal-Dual Ball Game
Here, we develop lower bounds for the case considered in Section 5.3. As before, to prove a lower bound it
is enough to take an i.i.d. or product distribution. In particular, the product distribution described after
Eq. (13) is of particular interest. To this end, choose p = p1 × . . . × pT to be a product of symmetric
distributions on the surface of the primal ball Z with E ptZ = 0. We conclude that Φ(pt) = 0 and
1
T
RT ≥ −EΦ(PˆT ) = −E inf
f∈F
f ·
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Zt
)
= E
∥∥∥∥∥− 1T
T∑
t=1
Zt
∥∥∥∥∥
by the definition of dual norm. Now, because of symmetry,
E
∥∥∥∥∥− 1T
T∑
t=1
Zt
∥∥∥∥∥ = 1T E E
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
tZt
∥∥∥∥∥ = 1T EE 
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
tZt
∥∥∥∥∥ . (15)
We conclude that RT ≥
√
TE R̂ad(F), the expected Rademacher averages of the dual ball acting on the
primal ball. This is within a factor of 2 of the upper bound (14) of Section 5.3. Hence, for the linear game
on primal-dual ball, a product distribution is within a factor 2 from the optimum. Note that this is not true
for curved losses.
Now, consider the particular case of F = Z = B2, the Euclidean ball. We will consider three distributions
p.
• Suppose p is such that pt
(·|Zt−11 ) puts mass on the intersection of B2 and the subspace perpendicular
to
∑t−1
s=1 Zs and E [Z|Zt−11 ] = 0. Then E
∥∥∥∑Tt=1 Zt∥∥∥ = √T by unraveling the sum from the end. In
fact, this is shown to be the optimal value for this problem in [1]. We conclude that a non-product
distribution achieves the optimal regret for this problem.
• Consider any symmetric i.i.d. distribution on the surface of the ball Z. Note that for this case we
still have the lower bound of Eq. (15). Kinchine-Kahane inequality then implies RT ≥
√
T
2 and the
constant
√
2 is optimal (see [10]) in the absence of further assumptions.
• Consider another example of an i.i.d. distribution that puts equal mass on two points ±z0 on each
round, with ‖z0‖ = 1. It then follows that this i.i.d. distribution achieves the regret equal to the length
of the random walk E
∣∣∣∑Tt=1 t∣∣∣, which is known to be asymptotically √2T/pi.
• We expect that putting a uniform distribution on the surface of the ball will give a regret close to
optimal
√
T as the number of dimensions grows, since Zt is likely to be orthogonal to the sum of
previous choices, as in the first (dependent) example.
We conclude that for the Euclidean game, the best strategy of the adversary is a sequence of dependent
distributions, while product and i.i.d. distributions come within a multiplicative constant close to 1 from it.
7.2 Experts Setting
The experts setting provides some of the easiest examples for linear games. We start with a simplified game,
where F = Z = ∆N , the N -simplex. The Φ function for this case is easy to visualize. We then present the
usual game, where the set Z = [0, 1]N . In both cases, we are interested in lower-bounding regret.
7.2.1 The simplified game
Let us look at the game when only one expert can suffer a loss of 1 per round, i.e. the space of actions Z
contains N elements e1, . . . , eN . The probability over these choices of the adversary is an N -dimensional
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simplex, just as the space of functions F . For any p ∈ ∆N ,
Φ(p) = min
f∈∆N
E pZ · f = min
f
p · f = min
i∈[N ]
pi
and therefore the Φ has the shape of a pyramid with its maximum at p∗ = 1N 1 and Φ(p
∗) = 1/N . The regret
is lower-bounded by an i.i.d game with this distribution p∗ at each round, i.e.
RT ≥ Φ(p∗)− EΦ(U) = 1
N
− E min
f∈∆N
(
1
T
∑
Zt
)
f
= E max
i∈[N ]
[
1
N
− ni
T
]
,
where ni is the number of times ei has been chosen out of T rounds. This is the expected maximum deviation
from the mean of a multinomial distribution, i.e. 1/N minus the smallest proportion of balls in any bin after
T balls have been distributed uniformly at random.
To obtain the lower bound on the maximum deviation, let us turn to Section 6. The convex hull of
the (negative) loss class co[−`(F)] is the simplex itself. This is also the face supported by the uniform
distribution p∗. The lower bound of Theorem 19 involves the Gaussian process indexed by a set Q. Let
us take f∗ = 1N 1 and F∗ = {e1, . . . , eN} ∪ {f∗}. We can verify that E eTiZ = Φ(p∗) = 1N , the covariance
of the process indexed by Q = `(F∗) is E (eTiZ − 1N )(eTjZ − 1N ) = − 1N2 for i 6= j and the variance is
E (eTiZ − 1N )2 = N−1N2 . Let {Yi}N1 be the Gaussian random variables with the aforementioned covariance
structure. Then ‖Yi − Yj‖2 = E (Yi − Yj)2 = 2N . We can now construct independent Gaussian random
variables {Xi}N1 with the same distance by putting 2N on the diagonal of the covariance matrix. By Slepian’s
Lemma, 12E supiXi ≤ E supi Yi, thus giving us the lower bound
RT ≥ c
√
T logN
N
for this problem, for some absolute constant c and T large enough.
7.2.2 The general case
In the more general game, any expert can suffer a 0/1 loss. Thus, p is a distribution on 2N losses Z. To lower
bound the regret, choose a uniform distribution on 2N binary vectors as the i.i.d. choice for the adversary.
We have Φ
(
1
2N
1
)
= minf∈∆N f · EZ = 1/2. As for the other term, EΦ(PˆT ) = E minf∈∆N f ·
(
1
T
∑
Zt
)
.
Thus, the regret is
1
T
RT ≥ E max
i∈[N ]
[
1
2
−
∑T
t=1 i,t
T
]
,
where i,t are Rademacher {±1}-valued random variables. It is easy to show that the expected maximum is
lower bounded by c
√
logN/T . This coincides with a result in [5], which shows that the asymptotic behavior
is
√
logN/(2T ).
7.3 Quadratic Loss
We consider the quadratic loss, `(z, f) = ‖f − z‖2. This loss function is 1-strongly convex, and therefore
we already have the O(log T ) bound of Corollary 15. In this section, we present an almost matching lower
bound using a particular adversarial strategy. The problem of quadratic loss was previously addressed in
[16]; we reprove their lower bound in our framework, borrowing a number of tricks from that work.
Following Section 6, it is tempting to use an i.i.d. distribution and compute the regret explicitly. Unfor-
tunately, this only leads to a constant lower bound, whereas we would hope to match the upper bound of
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log T . We can show this easily: let p := pT be some i.i.d. distribution, then
TEΦ(PˆT ) = (T − 1)E ‖Z1‖2 − T (T − 1)
T
E 〈Z1, Z2〉
= (T − 1) (E ‖Z‖2 − (EZ)2) = (T − 1)var(Z)
= (T − 1)Φ(p).
Thus
R(pT ) = TΦ(p)− TEΦ(PˆT ) = Φ(p),
where we see that the last term is independent of T .
Indeed, obtaining log T regret requires that we look further than i.i.d. To this end, define
cT :=
1
T
ct−1 := ct + c2t for all t = T, T − 1, . . . , 2
We construct our distribution p using this sequence as follows. Assume Z = F = [−1, 1] and for convenience
let Z1:s :=
∑s
t=1 Zt. Also, for this section, we use a shorthand for the conditional expectation, E t[·] :=
E [·|Z1, . . . , Zt−1]. Each conditional distribution is chosen as
pt(Zt = z|Z1, . . . , Zt−1) :=
{
1+ctZ1:t−1
2 , for z = 1
1−ctZ1:t−1
2 , for z = −1
.
Notice that this choice ensures that E tZt = ctZ1:t−1, i.e. the conditional expectation is identical to the
observed sample mean scaled by some shrinkage factor ct. That
1+ctZ1:t−1
2 ∈ [0, 1] follows from the statement
ct ≤ 1t which is proven by an easy induction. We now recall a result shown in [16]:
Lemma 20 (from [16]).
T∑
t=1
ct = log T − log log T + o(1)
This crucial lemma leads directly to the main result of this section.
Theorem 21. With p defined above, RT (p) =
∑T
t=1 ct and therefore
RT (p) = log T − log log T + o(1)
Proof. For all t = 0, 1, . . . , T , let
Qt := E
[
t∑
s=1
(Zs − E sZs)2 + ctZ21:t −
t∑
s=1
Z2s
+(ct+1 + ct+2 + . . .+ cT )] .
We will show by a backwards induction that Qt = RT (p), from which the result will follow since
∑T
t=1 ct =
Q0.
We begin with the base case, QT = RT (p). Recall, minf E (f − Z)2 = E (Z − EZ)2. At the same time,
minf
∑T
t=1(f − Zt)2 =
∑
t Z
2
t − (
P
t Zt)
2
T . This implies that
RT (p) = E
[
E t(Zt − E tZ)2 + (
∑
t Zt)
2
T
−
∑
t
Z2t
]
= QT ,
noting that the conditional expectations E t[·] are unnecessary within the full E [·].
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We now show that Qt = Qt−1. To begin, we will need to compute the following conditional expectation:
E t
[
Z21:t
]
=
1 + ctZ1:t−1
2
(Z1:t−1 + 1)2
+
1− ctZ1:t−1
2
(Z1:t−1 − 1)2 = Z21:t−1(1 + 2ct) + 1
Notice that we may write Qt −Qt−1 with the expression
E
[
ctZ
2
1:t − ct−1Z21:t−1 + (Zt − E tZt)2 − Z2t − ct
]
= E
[
E t
[
ctZ
2
1:t + (Zt − E tZt)2 − Z2t
]− ct−1Z21:t−1 − ct]
= E
[
ct(Z21:t−1(1 + 2ct) + 1)− (E tZt)2 − ct−1Z21:t−1 − ct
]
= E
[
ctZ
2
1:t−1 + 2c
2
tZ
2
1:t−1 − (ctZ1:t−1)2 − ct−1Z21:t−1
]
= E
[
(ct + c2t )Z
2
1:t−1 − ct−1Z21:t−1
]
= E
[
ct−1Z21:t−1 − ct−1Z21:t−1
]
= 0.
Hence, Qt = Qt−1 and we are done.
8 A Few More Results on Φ
The following result is in [9], Theorem 3.3.1.
Theorem 22. Let S1 and S2 be nonempty closed convex sets and σ1, σ2 are their respective support functions.
Then
S1 ⊂ S2 ⇔ σ1(x) ≤ σ2(x) for all x ∈ Rd
Hence, taking a subset of co [−`(F)] leads to a lower bound on the support function and, hence, on Φ.
We have an obvious corollary:
Corollary 23. Suppose S1 ⊂ S ⊂ S2, where S = co [−`(F)]] and all the sets are nonempty, closed and
convex. Then
Φ1 ≤ Φ ≤ Φ2,
where Φi(p) = min−`f∈Si〈−`f , p〉.
We remark that argmin of Φi can now be a loss vector of a function not found in F . However, this
possibility can be eliminated if Si are constructed as convex hulls of a subset of −`(F).
Let us now consider linear transformations of the loss class.
Proposition 24 (Proposition 3.3.3 in [9]). Let A : Rn → Rm be a linear operator, with adjoint A∗ (for
some scalar product 〈〈·, ·, 〉〉 in Rm). For S ⊂ Rn nonempty, we have
σclA(S)(y) = σS(A∗y) for all y ∈ Rm
We can now study linear transformations of the set co [−`(F)]. Suppose A is a linear invertible transfor-
mation and assume the set S contains a non-singular exposed face, implying a
√
T rate. If the transformation
A is such that the set A(S) still contains the exposed face (i.e. does not rotate it away from the origin),
then the minimax regret over the modified Φ is also
√
T . Moreover, it should be differing from the original
regret by a property of A, such as the condition number. We can use the idea of transformations A to define
isomorphic learning problems, i.e. those which can be obtained by some invertible mapping of the loss class.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 for general T . Consider the last optimization choice zT in Eq. (1). Suppose we instead
draw zT according to a distribution, and compute the expected value of the quantity in the parentheses in
Eq. (1). Then it is clear that maximizing this expected value over all distributions on Z is equivalent to
maximizing over zT , with the optimizing distribution concentrated on the optimal point. Hence,
RT = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−1∈F
sup
zT−1∈Z
inf
fT∈F
sup
pT∈P
E ZT∼pT
[
T∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
. (16)
In the last expression, it is understood that sums are over the sequence {z1, . . . , zT−1, ZT }. The first T − 1
elements are quantified in the suprema, while the last ZT is a random variable. Let us adopt the following
notation for the conditional expectation: E t[X] = E Zt∼pt [X|zt−11 ].
We now apply Proposition 2 to the last inf / sup pair in (16) with
M(fT , pT ) = E T
[
T∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
,
which is convex in fT (by assumption) and linear in pT . Moreover, the set F is compact, and both F and
P are convex. We conclude that
RT = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−1∈F
sup
zT−1∈Z
sup
pT∈P
inf
fT∈F
E T
[
T∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)− inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
]
= inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−1∈F
sup
zT−1∈Z
sup
pT∈P
(
T−1∑
t=1
`(zt, ft) + inf
fT∈F
E T [`(ZT , fT )]− E T inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
)
= inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−1∈F
sup
zT−1∈Z
[
T−1∑
t=1
`(zt, ft) + sup
pT∈P
{
inf
fT∈F
E T [`(ZT , fT )]− E T inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}]
(17)
= inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−2∈F
sup
zT−2∈Z
(
T−2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)+
inf
fT−1∈F
sup
zT−1∈Z
[
`(zT−1, fT−1) + sup
pT∈P
{
inf
fT∈F
E T [`(ZT , fT )]− E T inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}])
,
As we swap inf / sup from inside out, zt’s are taken to be random variables and denoted by Zt. Below, we
replace Zt’s in the infima over ft of conditional expectations by a dummy variable Z.
It is important to note that the maximizing distribution pT depends on the previous choices zT−11 , but
not on any of the ft’s. As before, we can replace the supremum over zT−1 by a supremum over distributions
pT−1. Noting that the expression inside of square brackets is convex in fT−1 and linear in a distribution
pT−1 on ZT−1, we invoke Proposition 2 again to obtain
RT = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−2∈F
sup
zT−2∈Z
(
T−2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)+
sup
pT−1∈P
inf
fT−1∈F
E T−1
[
`(ZT−1, fT−1) + sup
pT∈P
{
inf
fT∈F
E T [`(Z, fT )]− E T inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}])
= inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−2∈F
sup
zT−2∈Z
(
T−2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)+
sup
pT−1∈P
[(
inf
fT−1∈F
E T−1 [`(Z, fT−1)]
)
+ E T−1 sup
pT∈P
{
inf
fT∈F
E T [`(Z, fT )]− E T inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
}])
.
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Again, it is understood that in the last term, the sum is ranging over {z1, . . . , zT−2, ZT−1, ZT }. Since
the term in round brackets (involving inffT−1) does not depend on pT or ZT−1, we can pull it inside the
supremum:
RT = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−2∈F
sup
zT−2∈Z
(
T−2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)+
sup
pT−1∈P
E T−1 sup
pT∈P
{
inf
fT−1∈F
E T−1 [`(Z, fT−1)] + inf
fT∈F
E T [`(Z, fT )]− E T inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
})
.
We now argue that choosing a distribution pT−1, averaging over the ZT−1 under the maximizing distribution,
and then maximizing over the conditional pT (·|ZT−1) is the same as maximizing over the joint distributions
pT−1,T over (ZT−1, ZT ) and then averaging. Hence,
RT = inf
f1∈F
sup
z1∈Z
· · · inf
fT−2∈F
sup
zT−2∈Z
(
T−2∑
t=1
`(zt, ft)+
sup
pT−1,T
E T−1
{
inf
fT−1∈F
E T−1 [`(Z, fT−1)] + inf
fT∈F
E T [`(Z, fT )]− E T inf
f∈F
T∑
t=1
`(zt, f)
})
.
Comparing this to (17), we observe that the process can be repeated for the inf / sup pair at time (T −2)
and so on.
Proof of Lemma 6. Concavity of Φ is easy to establish. For any distributions p and q, we see that
Φ
(
p+ q
2
)
= inf
f∈F
E p+q
2
`(Z, f) ≥ 1
2
inf
f∈F
E p`(Z, f) +
1
2
inf
f∈F
E q`(Z, f) =
1
2
(Φ(p) + Φ(q)) .
As for concavity of RT , let pα := αp+(1−α)q and note the simple calculation of the conditional probability
dpα(Zt|Zt−11 ) =
αdp(Zt−11 )dp(Zt|Zt−11 ) + (1− α)dq(Zt−11 )dq(Zt|Zt−11 )
αdp(Zt−11 ) + (1− α)dq(Zt−11 )
.
We can now show that
T∑
t=1
E pαΦ(pα(·|Zt−11 ))
=
T∑
t=1
∫
Φ(pα(·|Zt−11 ))(αdp(Zt−11 ) + (1− α)dq(Zt−11 ))
≥
T∑
t=1
∫
αdp(Zt−11 )Φ(p(·|Zt−11 )) + (1− α)dq(Zt−11 )Φ(q(·|Zt−11 ))
αdp(Zt−11 ) + (1− α)dq(Zt−11 )
× (αdp(Zt−11 ) + (1− α)dq(Zt−11 ))
=
T∑
t=1
αE pΦ(p(·|Zt−11 )) + (1− α)E qΦ(q(·|Zt−11 )).
Thus, the first term in the regret is concave with respect to the joint distribution. In addition the second
term is clearly linear, since
−E pαΦ(PˆT ) = −αE pΦ(PˆT )− (1− α)E qΦ(PˆT ).
Since a linear plus a concave function is still concave, RT (·) is concave.
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Proof of Lemma 13. Since ` is σ-strongly convex, we have (by taking f = fp, g = fq in the definition of
strong convexity)
`(z, fp) + `(z, fq)
2
≥ `
(
z,
fp + fq
2
)
+
σ
8
‖fp − fq‖2
for any z. Taking expectations with respect to z ∼ p and noting that fp minimizes E p`(z, f), we have
E p
[
`(z, fp) + `(z, fq)
2
]
≥ E p`
(
z,
fp + fq
2
)
+
σ
8
‖fp − fq‖2
≥ E p` (z, fp) + σ8 ‖fp − fq‖
2
Rearranging terms,
σ
4
‖fp − fq‖2 ≤ E p`(z, fq)− E p`(z, fp).
Similarly,
σ
4
‖fp − fq‖2 ≤ E q`(z, fp)− E q`(z, fq).
Adding,
σ
2
‖fp − fq‖2 ≤
∫
z
[`(z, fq)− `(z, fp)] (dp(z)− dq(z)).
Using the Lipschitz condition,
σ
2
‖fp − fq‖2 ≤
∫
z
|`(z, fq)− `(z, fp)| · |dp(z)− dq(z)|
≤ L‖fp − fq‖ · ‖p− q‖1
Thus,
‖fp − fq‖ ≤ 2L
σ
‖p− q‖1,
which establishes the main building block resulting from the curvature.
Lemma 25. If ` satisfies the conditions of Theorem 12, then `(·, fp) is a subdifferential of Φ at p.
Proof. We claim that `(·, fp) is the differential of Φ at the point p and, therefore,
∫
z
`(z, fp)(dq(z)−dp(z)) =
〈∇Φ(p), (q− p)〉 is the derivative in the direction q− p. By definition, the differential is a function ∇Φ such
that
lim
h→0
Φ(p)− Φ(p+ h)−∇Φ(p) · h
‖h‖ = 0.
Hence, it remains to check that for any distribution r
lim
α→0
Φ((1− α)p+ αr)− Φ(p)− ∫
z
`(z, fp)(α(dr(z)− dp(z)))
α
= 0. (18)
Rewriting,
Φ((1− α)p+ αr)− Φ(p)−
∫
z
`(z, fp)(α(dr(z)− dp(z)))
= min
f
E (1−α)p+αr`(z, f)− (1− α) min
f
E p`(z, f)− αE r`(z, fp)
= min
f
[(1− α)E p`(z, f) + αE r`(z, f)]− (1− α)E p`(z, fp)− αE r`(z, fp)
24
It is evident that the above expression is non-positive by substituting a particular choice of fp in the first
minimum. For the lower bound, use the bound of Eq. (11)
E (1−α)p+αr`(z, f(1−α)p+αr)− (1− α)E p`(z, fp)− αE r`(z, fp)
= E (1−α)p+αr`(z, f(1−α)p+αr)− E (1−α)p+αr`(z, fp)
≥ −2L
2
σ
‖α(p− r)‖21 = −Θ(α2)
Thus, Eq. (18) is verified.
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